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Recent Developments

Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore:
A Police Officer May Lose Immunity From Civil Liability Where a Special
Relationship Exists
By Nichole Galvin

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that where
a police officer's affirmative
actions and specific promises of
protection establish a special
relationship, his immunity from
civil liability might not survive.
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore,
359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000).
In so holding, the court limited a
police officer's immunity from civil
liability for negligent discretionary
acts and provided a way for victims
of police negligence to recover for
their injuries.
On June 19, 1995, Baltimore
City Police Officer Edward Colbert
("Colbert") responded to a
domestic violence call from Mary
Williams ("Williams"), who had
arrived home to find that her
daughter, Valerie Williams
("Valerie"), had been beaten by her
boyfriend, George Watkins
("Watkins"). While Colbert was
taking statements, Watkins called
and threatened to return to the house.
Colbert told Valerie he was going
to his car to call for someone to bring
a camera.
Williams' and Colbert's stories
differed from this point. Williams
alleged that she went out to the car
and Colbert instructed her to stay
in the house while he waited for an
officer to bring a camera to
document her injuries. Colbert
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 84

claimed that he recieved Williams'
consent to leave to retrieve a camera
to document her bruises. Williams
alleged that she went inside the
house and left the door unlocked
because she believed Colbert was
outside. Shortly thereafter, Williams
was going to talk to Colbert, but
upon reaching the front door,
Colbert was not outside. Instead,
she found Watkins rushing to the
house, and before she could shut the
door, Watkins forced himself
inside. Upon entering, Watkins
shot Williams in the head and leg,
killed Valerie and then shot himself.
Williams filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against the State of Maryland, the
Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore City, and Colbert. The
circuit court dismissed the claims
against the city and state and granted
Colbert's motion for summary
judgment, which the court of special
appeals affirmed. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to decide whether Colbert
was divested of discretion and
ordered to protect Valerie and
Williams, whether Colbert was
protected by statutory immunity or
common law immunity, and whether
Colberts actions established a
special relationship. Williams, 359
Md. at 108, 753 A.2d at 45.
First, the court held that Article

27, section 798 (B)(2) of the
Maryland Code ("section 798")
and Baltimore City Police
Department General Order 10-93
("BCPD 10-93 ") did not divest
Colbert of discretion and mandated
that he protect the Williamses
because neither was applicable to
the facts of the case. Id. at 129,
753 A.2d at 56. The court
determined that the legislative
purpose of section 798 was to
authorize the police under the
umbrella of statutory immunity to
protect domestic violence victims
where the violence occurs in the
officer's presence and where the
officer escorts a victim, who has fled
the family home, back to the home
to recover personal items. /d. at 125,
753 A.2d at 54.
Neither
circumstance existed in this case. /d.
Moreover, the court held that BCPD
10-93 creates a duty to protect
domestic violence victims at the time
the violence is occurring, and not for
an indefinite period oftime. Id. at
129,753 A.2d at 56. Accordingly,
Colbert was not mandated by section
798 or BCPD 10-93 to protect
Valerie and Williams and was
therefore not divested of discretion.
!d.
Second, the court held that
Colbert was protected by statutory
immunity generally and by common
law immunity to the extent that his
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acts were discretionary. I d. at 131,
753 A.2d at 57. Statutory immunity
in the context of public official
immunity is codified in sections 5511 (b)and 5-61 O(b) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article ofthe
Maryland Code. !d. (citing Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-511(b),
5-610 (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.)).
Section 5-511 (b) provides statutory
immunity from civil liability for police
officers acting within the scope oftheir
employment in a discretionary manner
without malice. I d. Section 5-61 O(b)
provides immunity for a police officer
who responds to requests for
assistance under the authority of
Article 27, section 798. !d. at 131,
753 A.2d at 57. The court opined
that although section 798 was
inapplicable to the present case, it
shed light on the legislative intent to
ensure that officers were in no way
"stripped of their accustomed
immunity'' when acting within statutory
authority. !d. at 134, 753 A.2d at 58.
The legislature sought to alleviate
the fear of police officers that if they
found themselves acting beyond the
scope of normal police authority,
that such non-traditional activity
might divest them of immunity. !d.
at 132, 753 A.2d at 58. The court
held that Colbert was generally
protected by statutory immunity.
Common law immunity confers
a duty on the police to provide
protection to the general public, not
to specific individuals. !d. at 138,
753 A.2d at 61. This public duty
doctrine requires that the government
representative be a public official, that
the tortious conduct occurred while
making a discretionary decision in the

course of performing official duties,
and that the conduct is without malice.
!d. at 141,753 A.2d at 62. The law
in Maryland is well settled, police
officers performing their duties are
public officials and as such, fall within
the purview of qualified immunity as
to their discretionary acts. !d. (citing
Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312
Md. 662,672,541 A.2d 1303, 1308
(1988)).
Common law immunity
encompasses the concept of a
discretionary function or act.
Williams, 359 Md. at 140,753 A.2d
at 62. A discretionary function is ''the
freedom to act according to ones
judgment in the absence of a hard and
fast rule." Id. at 139, 753 A.2d at
62. Colbert ordinarily had the
discretion to leave and pick up the
camera, however, if he told the
Williarnses that he would remain, then
he had a duty to tell them he was
leaving. !d. Accordingly, the court
held that Colbert was acting within the
scope of his employment, without
malice and to the extent that his actions
were discretionary, he qualified for
immunity from civil liability. I d. at
141, 753 A.2d at 62.
The third and determinative issue
addressed by the court was whether
Colbert's affirmative actions and
specific promises of protection to
Valerie and Mary Williams created a
special relationship. Jd. at 144,753
A.2d at 64. In Ashburn v. Anne
Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510
A.2d 1078 ( 1986), the court of
appeals held that a special
relationship existed if a police officer
affirmatively acted to protect specific
victims, which resulted in the victim's

reliance upon this protection to their
detriment. Jd. at 150, 753 A.2d at
68.
In Ashburn, a police officer
stopped an intoxicated driver and
rather than arresting him, ordered
him to stop driving and park his car
for the night. !d. After the officer
left, the driver continued driving and
hit a pedestrian, John Ashburn. !d.
The Ashburn court held that a
special relationship did not exist
because the officer had not acted
specifically to Ashburn's benefit.
!d.
In the present case, the court
affirmed Ashburn and held that to
survive summary judgment, a victim
must prove that an officer
affirmatively acted to specifically
protect her and that she relied on
that protection to her detriment. !d.
at 151, 753 A.2d at 68. The court
found that the facts alleged by
Williams, if true, were sufficient to
establish a special relationship. !d.
If a special relationship existed,
Colbert had a duty to remain at the
horne or to inform Williams he was
going to leave. !d.
The impact of the William s
decision is two-fold. First, police
officers may hesitate to offer
protection to domestic violence
victims unless the violence occurred
in their presence or they are escorting
the victim to the horne to recover
personal belongings. In other
situations, officers will not want to risk
the potential liability from a victim
interpreting their actions as affirmative
actions evoking reliance by the victim.
Second, the claims ofvictims who are
able to allege facts establishing a
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special relationship will be given
their day in court rather than barred
from recovery by common law
immunity.
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